Discrete Choice under Oaths

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Stéphane Luchini (), Jason Shogren and Verity Watson
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Stéphane Luchini: Aix-Marseille University - Aix-Marseille School of Economics, CNRS and EHESS

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Using discrete choices to elicit preferences is a major tool to help guide public policy. Although Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) remains by far the most popular mechanism used to elicit preferences, its reliability still is questionable. Using an induced value experimental design, we show that standard benchmarks achieve no more than 56% (hypothetical answers with no monetary incentives) to 60% (real monetary incentives) of payoff maximizing choices. Herein we demonstrate that having respondents sign a the truth-telling oath reduces non-payoff maximizing choices by nearly 50% relative to these benchmarks. The explicit and voluntary commitment to honesty improved decisions. Further, we show that it is the explicit commitment to honesty induced by the truth-telling oath improves choices, not just any oath mechanism, i.e., an oath to task or to duty did not improve choices

Keywords: Discrete Choice Experiments; Stated Preferences; Oath; Truth-telling; External validity; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H4 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-dcm and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2019/19007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Discrete Choice under Oaths (2019)
Working Paper: Discrete Choice under Oaths (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:19007

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