The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation

Franz Dietrich and Christian List ()
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Christian List: LMU Munich

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: A probability aggregation rule assigns to each profile of probability functions across a group of individuals (representing their individual probability assignments to some propositions) a collective probability function (representing the group's probability assignment). The rule is "non-manipulable" if no group member can manipulate the collective probability for any proposition in the direction of his or her own probability by misrepresenting his or her probability function ("stratgic voting"). We show that, except in trivial cases, no probability aggregation rule satisfying two mild conditions (non-dictatorship and consensus preservation) is non-manipulable

Keywords: opinion pooling; social choice theory; non-manipulability; strategy-proofness; impossibility theorem, judgment aggregation; Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2024/24001.pdf (application/pdf)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04405495

Related works:
Working Paper: The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation (2024)
Working Paper: The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:24001

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