Why do North African firms involve in corruption?

Clara Delavallade

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of different forms of corruption supply. Our study is based on a new database of near 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. We show that the undeclared part of firms' sales is a major factor of their involvement in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the part of the firm's informal activity as far as it is inferior to 55% of total sales, before slightly decreasing. State capture is rather strengthened by a failing enforcement of property and contract rights. Moreover, both forms of corruption help to compensate a loss of competitiveness, which contradicts previous results on this issue. Finally, we draw a comparison of the factors of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries and derive policy recommendations

Keywords: Supply of corruption; administrative corruption; state capture; informal activity; competitiveness; North Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C2 D73 H32 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2007-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dev, nep-pbe and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00143412 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Why do North African firms involve in corruption? (2007)
Working Paper: Why do North African firms involve in corruption? (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:v07002

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