Incentives to learn calibration: a gender-dependent impact

Marie-Pierre Dargnies () and Guillaume Hollard
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Marie-Pierre Dargnies: Paris School of Economics - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Miscalibration can be defined as the fact that people think that their knowledge is more precise than it actually is. In a typical miscalibration experiment, subjects are asked to provide subjective confidence intervals. A very robust finding is that subjects provide too narrow intervals at the 90% level. As a result a lot less than 90% of correct answers fall inside the 90% intervals provided. As miscalibration is linked with bad results on a experimental financial market (Biais et al., 2005) and entrepreneurial success is positively correlated with good calibration (Regner et al., 2006), it appears interesting to look for a way to cure or at least reduce miscalibration. Previous attempts to remove the miscalibration bias relied on extremely long and tedious procedures. Here, we design an experimental setting that provides several different incentives, in particular strong monetary incentives; i.e. that make miscalibration costly. Our main result is that a thirty-minute training session has an effect on men's calibration but no effect on women's

Keywords: Miscalibration; overconfidence; incentives; gender effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2008/V08088.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives to learn calibration: a gender-dependent impact (2009)
Working Paper: Incentives to Learn Calibration: A Gender-Dependent Impact (2009)
Working Paper: Incentives to Learn Calibration: A Gender-Dependent Impact (2009)
Working Paper: Incentives to Learn Calibration: A Gender-Dependent Impact (2009)
Working Paper: Incentives to Learn Calibration: a Gender-Dependent Impact (2008)
Working Paper: Incentives to Learn Calibration: a Gender-Dependent Impact (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:v08088

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