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How can gender discrimination explain fertility behaviors and family-friendly policies?

Magali Recoules ()
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Magali Recoules: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: This paper focuses on the interaction between gender discrimination and household decisions. It develops a general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility, endogenous labor supply and endogenous size of government spending. Family policies are assumed to decrease the time that parents spend on their children. The model shows that gender discrimination may explain differences in household decisions between countries. The solution shows a U-shaped relationship between fertility and gender discrimination. An increase in the discrimination level implies a related decrease in fertility, women's participation in the labor force and in family-friendly policies

Keywords: Gender discrimination; fertility; labor supply; public policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H31 J13 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2008/V08098.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:v08098

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