Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games

Vincent Iehlé ()
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Vincent Iehlé: CERMSEM

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games

Keywords: Cooperative games; contestable markets; sustainability; subsidy free; parameterized cost games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 L11 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b05023

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