Team versus individual reputations: a model of interaction and some empirical evidence

Olivier Gergaud and Olivier Gergaud
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Olivier Gergaud: OMI

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: How do individuals, goods or services (e.g. researchers) through their own reputation give birth to a group's reputation (e.g. a laboratory) and conversely how do they take advantage of this group's reputation. Do they contribute to (derive benefit from) the group's reputation proportionally to their individual reputation or in a different way? To answer these questions we develop in this paper a theoretical model in which collective reputation both determines and is determined -simultaneously- by individual reputations as suggested first by Tirole (1996). This paper also proposes an empirical strategy to assess both umbrella impacts (the impact of a collective reputation on a given individual reputation) and contributions to the umbrella (the contrary). Then, the theoretical model is applied to the case of Bordeaux wines from a rich dataset on individual opinions

Keywords: Individual reputation; collective reputation; cultural goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L15 L66 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/Bla04015.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Team versus Individual Reputations: a Model of Interaction and some Empirical Evidence (2004)
Working Paper: Team versus Individual Reputations: a Model of Interaction and some Empirical Evidence (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla04015

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