Les fondements économiques de la gratuité des biens et services informationnels. Financement indirect et investissement en gratuité
Françoise Vasselin
Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)
Abstract:
Usually, an economic good isn't available gratuitously, but the case of information goods and services (IGS) is specific. Their intrinsic properties allow zero prices that is unconceivable for the others economic private goods. The gratuitousness is not the aim of productive activity; it results from private choices we can group into two innovative generic models. On the one hand, the indirect financing of gratuitousness for information services is based on natural factors of gratuitousness inherent in information. On the other hand, the offer strategy of information goods uses potential factors of gratuitousness linked to their production and their distribution. These models are founded on the information valorisation, the getting round of intellectual property rights, opportunity cost and sacrifice of margins that constitute the economic foundations of gratuitousness of IGS
Keywords: Information goods and services; free; economies of scale; externalities; rivalry; exclusion; appropriation; strategy; financing; investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H41 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-net and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:r05037
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