A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale: l'approche par les coûts d'efficience

Kalina Koleva ()
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Kalina Koleva: MATISSE

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: Actual fiscal structures' functioning is greatly constrained by some distortions, such as efficiency costs, due to the coercitive nature of tax collection. The mainstream optimal taxation literature ignores, however, the incurring tax system costs. Given these costs and in presence of fiscal evasion and fiscal avoidance, the policy tools' efficiency is clearly diminished. Integrating fiscal avoidance and evasion into normative analysis of taxation means introducing a new set of policy instruments whose optimal setting is at issue. It also invites to consider the theory of " optimal tax systems ". In order to study these institutional and societal tax features a methodological reorientation is needed. The effective cost of taxation would be then more visible and thus easier to integrate into public economics topics. Subsequently, this investigation requires a new efficiency costs typology jointly with a revision of social welfare effects.

Keywords: Efficiency costs; fiscal avoidance; fiscal evasion; optimal taxation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H21 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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