Transboundary pollution in the black sea: comparison of institutional arrangements

Basak Bayramoglu

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This paper analyses the transboundary pollution between Romania and Ukraine, coastal states along the Black Sea, and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem. To achieve this goal, we use a dynamic and strategic framework. We compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first-best case with three different institutional arrangements : the noncooperative game of countries, the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the Black Sea Commission. Our findings indicate that the noncooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules

Keywords: Black Sea; dynamic games; environment; institutional arrangements; noncooperative games; transboundary pollution; water (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 Q5 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2004-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-res
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/V04020.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Transboundary Pollution in the Black Sea: Comparison of Institutional Arrangements (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v04020

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