Stratégies d'accès à l'estime de soi et relation d'emploi

Olivier Baguelin

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: A model of employment relation is provided in which agents choose whether to seek self-esteem through work. When they do, they develop an intrinsic motivation to effort. Depending on non-wage characteristics of the job the employer wants to fill, she can encourage this intrinsic motivation by a well-designed contract. We show that the profitability as well as the efficiency of the employment relation may depend on non-wage gratification opportunities workers get

Keywords: Intrinsic motivation; self-esteem; moral hazard; profitability; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J32 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2005/V05062.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Stratégies d'accès à l'estime de soi et relation d'emploi (2005)
Working Paper: Stratégies d'accès à l'estime de soi et relation d'emploi (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v05062

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