Allocation chômage: entre efficacité et égalité

Audrey Desbonnet ()
Additional contact information
Audrey Desbonnet: Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQua), https://leda.dauphine.fr/fr/membre/detail-cv/profile/audrey-desbonnet.html

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the trade-off between efficiency and equality of unemployment insurance in a job search model with precautionary saving. Contrary to Cahuc and Lehmann [2000], we show that a decreasing profile of unemployment benefits is able to alleviate this trade-off when agents can save. It is due to a change in saving time profile and an increase in job search effort. The short term unemployed begins to save when unemployment benefits become declining. When the unemployment episode expands, he becomes long term unemployed and dissaves which enables to support his consumption to a higher level

Keywords: Unemployment benefits; precautionary saving; equality; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D69 E24 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, Jstor, 90, 2008, pp. 181-214

Downloads: (external link)
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00130208 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.2307/27739823
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden (https://doi.org/10.2307/27739823 [302 Found]--> https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27739823)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v06084

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label ().