On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

Gérard Gaudet and Hervé Lohoues

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Keywords: common orty; natural resources; differential games; linear Markov strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D90 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-gth
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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/544 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-15

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