On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda

Robin Christian, Mike Fellows and Frances Rosamond

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose.

Keywords: lobbying; referendum; rametrized comexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-19

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