Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus ()

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof. First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing resource-monotonicity with two-agent consistent conflict resolution. An alternative characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of "acyclic" responsive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency.

Keywords: consistency; deferred-acceptance algorithm; indivisible objects allocation; resourcemonotonicity; strategy-proofness; weak non-wastefulness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2009
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2009-16

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