School Choice with Control

Lars Ehlers

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: Controlled choice over public schools is a common policy of school boards in the United States. It attempts giving choice to parents while maintaining racial and ethnic balance at schools. This paper provides a foundation for controlled school choice programs. We develop a natural notion of fairness and show that assignments, which are fair for same type students and constrained non-wasteful, always exist in controlled choice problems; a "controlled" version of the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (CDAA) always nds such an assignment which is also weakly Pareto-optimal. CDAA provides a practical solution for controlled school choice programs.

JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/4227 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: School Choice with Control (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2010-05

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