House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus ()

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.

Keywords: Deferred-acceptance-algorithm; indivisible objects allocation; resource-monotonicity; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-05

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