An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson and Lars Ehlers

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

Keywords: Least manipulable envy-free rules; algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/10313 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities (2014)
Working Paper: An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-12

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