Bandits in the Lab

Johannes Hoelzemann and Nicolas Klein

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We test Keller, Rady, Cripps’ (2005) game of strategic experimentation with exponential bandits in the laboratory. We find strong support for the prediction of free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find strong evidence for behavior that is characteristic of Markov perfect equilibrium: non-cutoff behavior, lonely pioneers and frequent switches of action.

Keywords: Strategic experimentation; exponential bandits; learning; dynamic games; Markov perfect equilibrium; continuous time; laboratory experiments; eye tracking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 D83 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bandits in the lab (2021)
Working Paper: Bandits in the Lab (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-09

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