Deliberation in Committees: Theory and Evidence from the FOMC

Alessandro Riboni and Francisco Ruge-Murcia

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper develops a model of committee decision-making where members of different expertise deliberate and share private information prior to voting. The model predicts that members truthfully reveal their private information and are willing to "change their minds" as a result of deliberation. The predictions of the model are evaluated using data from the Federal Open Market Committee.

Keywords: deliberation; voting; mind-changes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2018

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