Externalities and the Nucleolus

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos and Lars Ehlers

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games without externalities to games with externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.

Keywords: externalities; partition function; nucleolus; reduced game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Externalities and the nucleolus (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2017

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