Incentives when altruism is impure: The case of blood and living organ donations

María Errea () and Juan M. Cabasés ()
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María Errea: Departamento de Economía-UPNA, https://www.unavarra.es/departamento-economia
Juan M. Cabasés: Departamento de Economía-UPNA, https://www.unavarra.es/departamento-economia

Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra from Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra

Abstract: The decision to donate blood and living organs is considered voluntary and altruistic. However, the shortage of donors has opened an interesting debate in recent years, considering offering economic incentives to donors. This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives over individuals when facing the decision of becoming donors. Results show that crowding-in of blood donors would be more likely by offering "Information concerning blood donations" or "Blood Tests". In both, blood and living organ donations, "Money" would be very likely to crowd-out individuals from donating. Concerning living organs, we do not find good evidence for crowding-in. We conclude donation policies, properly designed, could help to increase the number of donors, and more specifically suggest implementing non-monetary incentives.

Keywords: social preferences; incentives; altruism; blood and living organ donations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hme and nep-soc
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