A Pilot Inquiry on Incentives and Intrinsic Motivation in Health Care: the Motivational Capital Explained by Doctors

Mikel Berdud (), Juan M. Cabasés Hita () and Jorge Nieto ()
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Juan M. Cabasés Hita: Departamento de Economía-UPNA
Jorge Nieto: Departamento de Economía-UPNA

Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra from Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra

Abstract: Where the contracts are incomplete, the resulting co-ordination problems may be attenuated if workers are intrinsically motivated to do the work. It is established by theoretical and empirical literature that workers within public organizations are intrinsically motivated to exert effort doing the job and have a strong sense of social agents with the mission of providing collective goods to citizens and tax payers. This paper is an empirical pilot study in the health care sector using methods of Qualitative Analysis research. We run semistructured interviews á-la- Bewley to sixteen physicians of Navarre’s health Care Servicio Navarro de Salud-Osasunbidea (SNS-O). The objective of the work is twofold: first, to find empirical evidence about doctors’ non-monetary motives and second, to find evidence about how these non-monetary motives shape doctors’behavior. We formulate several testable hypotheses: (1) Doctors are intrinsically motivated agents, (2) Economic incentives and control policies may crowd- out intrinsic motivation and (3) Well designed incentives may crowd-in agents intrinsic motivation. Results confirm the hypotheses formulated above and coming from our theoretical findings [11], [12]. Finally, we also found empirical evidence of conflict between political advisors or health managers (principals) and physicians (agents). Results are a step forward in the optimal design of incentive schemes and policies which crowd in doctors’ intrinsic motivation.

Keywords: qualitative research; interviews; intrinsic motivation; crowding effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ger, nep-hea and nep-hrm
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