EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Bank reactions after capital shortfalls

Christoffer Kok and Glenn Schepens

No 250, Working Paper Research from National Bank of Belgium

Abstract: This paper investigates whether European banks have capital targets and how deviations from the target impact their equity composition and activity mix. Using quarterly data for a sample of large European banks between 2004 and 2011, we show that there are notable asymmetries in banks’ reactions to deviations from optimal capital levels. Banks prefer to reshuffle risk-weighted assets or increase asset holdings when being above their optimal Tier 1 ratio, whereas they rather try to increase equity levels or reshuffle risk-weighted assets without changing asset holdings when being below target. At the same time, focusing instead on a unweighted equity ratio target, we find evidence of deleveraging and lower loan growth for undercapitalized banks during the recent financial crisis, whereas in the pre-crisis periods banks primarily reacted to deviations from their optimal target by adjusting equity levels.

Keywords: Banking; banking capital optimization; financial regulation; deleveraging; capital structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 E44 G20 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nbb.be/doc/ts/publications/wp/wp250en.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bank reactions after capital shortfalls (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbb:reswpp:201312-250

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Research from National Bank of Belgium Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:nbb:reswpp:201312-250