Beyond Classical Rationality: Two-Stage Rationalization

Vladimir Danilov ()

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2015, vol. 26, issue 2, 12-35

Abstract: Numerous facts indicate that behaviour (choice) of economic agents does not satisfy strong criterions of rationality. One of the possible explanation is in that the choice goes in two (or more) sequential stages. In the first stage, one chooses a subset F(A) from an initial menu A. Then the best element (with respert to some linear order) is chosen from F(A) . The resulting choice is not rational in the classical sense. However it possesses some specific properties which distinguish it from arbitrary non-rational behaviour. In the paper we give a survey of recent works on two-stage choice. Axiomatic characteristics of such a choice are given depending on rationality conditions of the first step choice.

Keywords: choice function; axioms of heredity; outcast; and concordance; filter; preferences; axiom of revealed preference; Plott function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2015-26-12-35r.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2015:i:26:p:12-35

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of the New Economic Association is currently edited by Victor Polterovich and Aleksandr Rubinshtein

More articles in Journal of the New Economic Association from New Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alexey Tcharykov ().