Managerial Paradoxes of Reform in Russian University Sector
E. Balatsky
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E. Balatsky: Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia
Journal of the New Economic Association, 2015, vol. 26, issue 2, 124-149
Abstract:
The article discusses the complex of anomalous effects that were the result of failed reforms in the higher education of Russia. The author showed the paradoxes that arose in the process of introducing the unified state exam, systems of testing and distance learning, state standards and regulations in terms of research, publications and citations. It was shown a devastating effect on universities from inadequate policy for the appointment of rectors and their remuneration. The paper discusses the problems of escalated confrontation between the administrative staff of universities and professors, addressing the challenges of availability of education and syndrome of shifting the responsibility from top down. The discussed effects are accompanied by stylized examples.
Keywords: institutions; reforms; higher education; state regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 I28 P21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2015:i:26:p:124-149
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