The Incentive To Participate In Open Source Projects: A Signaling Approach

Yossi Spiegel (spiegel@post.tau.ac.il)
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Yossi Spiegel: Tel Aviv University, http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel

No 05-23, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: This paper examines the incentives of programmers to contribute to open source software projects on a voluntary basis. In particular, the paper looks at this incentive changes as (i) performance becomes more visible to the relevant audience, (ii) effort has a stronger impact on performance, and (iii) performance becomes more informative about talent. In all three cases, it is shown that whether we start from a stable interior equilibrium or an unstable interior equilibrium.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2005-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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