Bundling and Tying

Nicholas Economides ()

No 14-22, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: We discuss strategic ways that sellers can use tying and bundling with requirement conditions to extract consumer surplus. We analyze different types of tying and bundling creating (i) intra-product price discrimination; (ii) intra-consumer price discrimination; and (iii) inter-product price discrimination, and assess the antitrust liability that these practices may entail. We also discuss the impact on consumers and competition, as well as potential antitrust liability of bundling “incontestable” and “contestable” demand for the same good.

Keywords: tying; ties; bundling; bundled rebates; loyalty discounts; loyalty requirement rebates; single monopoly surplus; monopolization; market power; foreclosure; antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D42 D43 K21 L12 L40 L41 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mkt
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bundling and Tying (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:net:wpaper:1422

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