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Platform, Anonymity, and Illegal Actors: Evidence of Whac-A-Mole Enforcement from Airbnb

Jian Jia () and Liad Wagman
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Jian Jia: Stuart School of Business, Illinois Institute of Technology, 565 W Adams, 4th Flr, Chicago, IL 60661

No 18-01, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: Airbnb, a prominent sharing-economy platform, offers dwellings for short-term rent. Despite restrictions, some sellers illegally offer their accommodations, taking advantage of a degree of anonymity proffered by the platform to hide from potential enforcement. We study the extent to which enforcement works in Manhattan, one of the most active short-term rental markets, by testing the effects of two recent enforcement events. We demonstrate that prices of entire-home listings in Manhattan increase and vacancies decrease following each enforcement event, suggesting that illegal entire-home listings are being withdrawn from the market, with these effects varying depending on neighborhood characteristics. We further demonstrate that a significant portion of withdrawn listings re-enter the market under the less-enforced listing category of private rooms.

Keywords: enforcement; anonymity; short-term rentals; platform; illegal supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L51 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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http://www.netinst.org/Wagman_18-01.pdf (application/pdf)
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Journal Article: Platform, Anonymity, and Illegal Actors: Evidence of Whac-a-Mole Enforcement from Airbnb (2020) Downloads
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