Retail Power Market Competition with Endogenous Entry Decision-An Auction Data Analysis

Nobuhiro Hosoe and Shingo Takagi
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Shingo Takagi: Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University

No 11-01, GRIPS Discussion Papers from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Abstract: Deregulation in the electric power industry has been aimed at promoting competition and thereby enhancing the industry's efficiency. We use the auction data of public power procurements to study the impact of the reform on the retail power market in Japan. We quantify this impact by measuring a decline in power charges, controlling for the endogeneity bias caused by the entrants' bid-submission decisions. Our results suggest that power charges would decline by about 0.48 yen/kWh on average when two or more providers bid at an auction.

Keywords: electric power industry; auction data; public procurement; sample selection bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2011-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-mst and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Retail power market competition with endogenous entry decision—An auction data analysis (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ngi:dpaper:11-01

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