Intrahousehold Bargaining and Agricultural Technology Adoption: Experimental Evidence from Zambia

Ken Miura (miura.ken.3e@kyoto-u.ac.jp), Yoko Kijima and Takeshi Sakurai
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Takeshi Sakurai: The University of Tokyo, Japan

No 20-01, GRIPS Discussion Papers from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Abstract: This study examines how technology adoption is determined in an intra-household bargaining process between spouses with different incentives and resource constraints. We develop a noncooperative bargaining model in which individual investments affect not only a household’s total income but also its members’ future bargaining position, which can yield Pareto-inferior outcomes. To test for possible inefficiency, we introduce rice seeds to farmers in rural Zambia and randomly distribute vouchers for transportation from the village to a miller in town to husbands and wives. The results show that the identity of the voucher recipients matters for rice seed take-up when wives choose which crop to grow on suitable plots for rice production. We also find that the voucher given to husbands is effective only when they manage the plots by themselves. Furthermore, intra-household information flows are distorted by the recipients. The heterogeneous effects and incomplete information sharing among spouses provide evidence against efficient resource pooling within the family. We present suggestive evidence that limited commitment to the production plan is a key mechanism behind strategic spousal behavior. Overall, this study highlights the importance of directly targeting individuals with productive resources relevant to a technology.

Keywords: Non-unitary model; productive efficiency; gender; targeting; Zambia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 70 pages
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-dev and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ngi:dpaper:20-01

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