Hospital competition and quality with regulated prices

Kurt Brekke (), Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume

No 06/2008, NIPE Working Papers from NIPE - Universidade do Minho

Abstract: We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital market with regulated prices, considering both the effect of free patient choice (monopoly versus competition) and increased competition through lower transportation costs (increased substitutability). With partially altruistic providers and a convex cost function that is non-separable in activity and quality, we show - in both cases - that the effect is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received theoretical literature, this is consistent with, and potentially explains, the mixed empirical evidence.

Keywords: Hospital; Competition; Quality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 I11 I18 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hea, nep-mic and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices (2011)
Working Paper: Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices (2009)
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