Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Luís Aguiar-Conraria (lfaguiar@eeg.uminho.pt), Pedro C. Magalhães (pedro.magalhaes@ics.ul.pt) and Christoph Vanberg
Additional contact information
Pedro C. Magalhães: University of Lisbon, Social Sciences Institute

No 14/2013, NIPE Working Papers from NIPE - Universidade do Minho

Abstract: In most instances of collective decision-making, it cannot be expected that all persons who are entitled to vote will end up doing so. This has led institutional designers, out of concerns with the “legitimacy” of decisions, to introduce quorum requirements. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We discuss the results of an experiment about the consequences of such quora. We show that quora lead to overall decreases in participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of status quo supporters.

Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2013/NIPE_WP_14_2013.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nip:nipewp:14/2013

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
nipe@eeg.uminho.pt

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NIPE Working Papers from NIPE - Universidade do Minho Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas e Empresariais, Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, P-4710-057 Braga, Portugal. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by NIPE (nipe@eeg.uminho.pt).