Portfolio Sales and Signaling

Spiros Bougheas and Timothy Worrall

No 2017/01, Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM)

Abstract: A common practice of banks has been to pool assets of different qualities and then sell a fraction of the newly created portfolios to investors. We extend the signaling model for single sales of risky assets to portfolio sales. We identify conditions under which signaling at the portfolio level dominates signaling at the single asset level. In particular, when banks have better information about loan types on their books, and some commitment power to sales, can profit by pooling assets whilst retaining a skin in the game.

Keywords: Securitization; Skin in the game; Signaling; Tranching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
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https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cfcm/documents/papers/cfcm-2017-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Portfolio sales and signaling (2019)
Working Paper: Portfolio Sales and Signaling (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcfc:17/01

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