Coercive Trade Policy

Vincent Anesi and Giovanni Facchini

No 2014-09, Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, GEP

Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests trade coercion exercised unilaterally is significantly less likely to induce concessions than coercion exercised through an international organization. In this paper we build a two-country model of coercion that can provide a rationale for this finding, and forhow “weak” international institutions might be effective, even if their rulings cannot be directly enforced. In particular we show that if coercion is unilateral, the country requesting the policychange will demand a concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to its partner, and a trade war will ensue. If the parties can instead commit to an international organization (IO), compliance is more likely, because the potential IO ruling places a cap on the Foreign government's incentives to signal its resolve.

Keywords: GATT; WTO; Dispute Settlement; Political Economy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
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https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/gep/documents/papers/2014/2014-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Coercive Trade Policy (2019)
Working Paper: Coercive Trade Policy (2015)
Working Paper: Coercive Trade Policy
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notgep:14/09

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