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Red herrings: A model of attention-hijacking by politicians

Margot Belguise

No 2024-01, Discussion Papers from Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)

Abstract: Politicians often use “red herrings” to distract voters from scandals. When do such red herrings succeed? I develop a model in which an incumbent runs for re-election and potentially faces a scandal. Some incumbents enjoy telling “tales” (attention-grabbing stories) while others use tales to distract voters from the scandal. Multiple equilibria can arise: one with a norm of tale-telling in which red herrings succeed and another with a norm against tale-telling in which they fail. Increased media attention to tales has a non-monotonic effect, facilitating red herrings at low attention levels, but serving a disciplinary function at high levels.

Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-inv, nep-mic and nep-pol
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