Corporate Payout Policy

Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo and Douglas J. Skinner

Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, 2009, vol. 3, issue 2–3, 95-287

Abstract: We present a synthesis of academic research on corporate payout policy grounded in the pioneering contributions of Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani (1961). We conclude that a simple asymmetric information framework that emphasizes the need to distribute FCF and that embeds agency costs (as in Jensen (1986)) and security valuation problems (as in Myers and Majluf (1984)) does a good job of explaining the main features of observed payout policies — i.e., the massive size of corporate payouts, their timing and, to a lesser degree, their (dividend versus stock repurchase) form. We also conclude that managerial signaling motives, clientele demands, tax deferral benefits, investors' behavioral heuristics, and investor sentiment have at best minor influences on payout policy, but that behavioral biases at the managerial level (e.g., over-confidence) and the idiosyncratic preferences of controlling stockholders plausibly have a first-order impact.

Keywords: Corporate payout policy; Dividends; Stock repurchases; Accounting; Corporate finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

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