Stability of International Fisheries Agreements Using Precautionary Bioeconomic Harvesting Strategies

Mika Rahikainen, Marko Lindroos and Veijo Kaitala

Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2013, vol. 3, issue 1–2, 97-120

Abstract: International agreements are necessary for exclusion of non-cooperative behavior. We parameterized an age-structured model for the North Sea herring fishery. The reference points of the current harvest control rule operationalize the precautionary approach. Applying the precautionary approach by the grand coalition adds the net present value of the fishery compared to another management approach, a fixed fishing mortality rate strategy. The fishing strategy and costs have a strong impact on the stability of the coalitions. Adopting a precautionary harvest control rule has potential to stabilize multilateral fishing agreements provided that fishing costs are not identical among countries. If they are identical, there will always be incentive for free riding.

Keywords: Risk management; Harvest control rule; Precautionary approach; Game theory; Fisheries agreement; North sea herring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K32 Q22 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000025

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