Does Introduction of Bureaucratic Competition Reduce Corruption in Public Service Delivery?

Panchali Banerjee () and Vivekananda Mukherjee
Additional contact information
Panchali Banerjee: Department of Economics, Jadavpur University

Working Papers from National Institute of Public Finance and Policy

Abstract: The paper theoretically explores the impact of introducing bureaucratic competition on corruption. For this purpose it considers three different measures of corruption such as corruption incidence (CI), relative corruption incidence (CRI) and corruption rents (CR) in two different types of economies namely corruption-tolerant economies and corruption-reliant economies. As it compares both intensive margin (i.e. the magnitude of bribe) and extensive margin (i.e. the number of bribe incident) of corruption with and without bureaucratic competition, it turns out that as traditionally perceived the introduction of bureaucratic corruption does not necessarily reduce corruption in an economy. The outcome depends on the type of the economy that has been studied, the measure of corruption being used and the initial level of corruption in the economy. Among the counterintuitive results, we find that in a corruption-tolerant economy going by the CI measure, corruption is always higher under competitive regime compared to monopoly regime. The same holds true if the CR measure is used in such economies with sufficiently high share of corrupt officials. In a reliant economy, if CRI measure is applied, corruption is more in competitive regime.

Keywords: Corruption; Competition; Bureaucracy; Red tape; Measures of corruption; Extortion; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger and nep-law
Note: Working Paper 152, 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2015/07/WP_2015_152.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Does Introduction of Bureaucratic Competition Reduce Corruption in Public Service Delivery? (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:npf:wpaper:15/152

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from National Institute of Public Finance and Policy
Bibliographic data for series maintained by S.Siva Chidambaram ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).