Central government control and fiscal adjustment: Norwegian evidence

Arnt Ove Hopland ()
Additional contact information
Arnt Ove Hopland: Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Abstract: Norwegian local governments that violate the balanced budget rule (BBR) are placed in a register. The consequence of being in the register is that the budget and resolutions to raise new loans must be approved by the county governor, the central government's representative in the county. Local governments in the register are subject to stronger central government control and must tighten their budgetary policy in order to be removed from the register. The findings suggest that local governments in the register improve their operating surplus, mainly due to cost reductions.

Keywords: Fiscal adjustment; balanced budget regulations; fiscal federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 H72 H74 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2012-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/WP/2012/15_H_Robek_july12.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nst:samfok:13812

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Larsen ().