Restoring a Fish Stock: A Dynamic Bankruptcy Problem

Anders Skonhoft () and Elena Inarra

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Abstract: Total Allowable Catch (TAC) regulating schemes have been introduced in most fisheries. TAC distribution following the Proportional Rule, based on historical catches, implies that harvesters or vessel groups which have captured more in the past and contributed to overfishing are getting larger quotas than groups that have contributed less to overfishing. In contrast to this rule a more egalitarian rule, the Constrained Equal Award Rule, is proposed for distributing the TAC. Contingent upon the fishing techniques used by the harvesters, it is demonstrated how the fish stock recovery period, harvest and profitability may vary according to these two rules.

JEL-codes: C70 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2007-04-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
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http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/WP/2007/2Bankruptcy0307.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Restoring a Fish Stock: A Dynamic Bankruptcy Problem (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nst:samfok:8507

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