Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful

Michael Keen

National Tax Journal, 2001, vol. 54, issue 4, 757-62

Abstract: A key feature of the recent EU and OECD standards for good behavior in international taxation is a presumption against preferential tax regimes (such as those offering advantageous treatment to non-residents or enterprises not active in the domestic market), which are seen as especially corrosive forms of tax competition. This paper shows that, on the contrary, preferential regimes may serve a useful strategic purpose in enabling countries to confine their most aggressive tax competition to particular parts of the tax system. Proscribing them therefore may--in the model here, certainly will--actually worsen tax competition.

Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (161)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:54:y:2001:i:4:p:757-62

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