Strategic Bidding in Product-Mix, Sequential, and Simultaneous Auctions

Simon Finster (simon.finster@nuffield.ox.ac.uk)
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Simon Finster: Nuffield College and Department of Economics, University of Oxford

No 2020-W03, Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: We study equilibria in Product-Mix, sequential, and simultaneous auctions, which are used to sell differentiated, indivisible goods. A flexible bidder with unit demand, interested in buying any of the goods, competes against several inflexible bidders, each interested in only one specific good. For first-price and second-price payments, we obtain theoretical results on equilibrium bidding, and compare efficiency, revenue, and bidder surplus numerically. Differences in outcomes between Product-Mix and sequential auctions are small for a range of value distributions. The simultaneous auction performs worst in all dimensions, and differences in performance vary substantially with the degree of competition the flexible bidder faces.

Keywords: multi-unit auctions; asymmetric auctions; market power; menu auctions; sequential auctions; simultaneous auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D47 D61 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2020-03-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:2003

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