 The Antitrust Regulation Harms ConsumersGeorgi Kiranchev
Economic Alternatives, 2024, issue 4, 722-739 Abstract: This article examines the effects of antitrust regulation. It is always assumed that this regulation has the purpose and function of protecting the interests of consumers. The other function of regulation is to protect competition, and it is assumed that this also indirectly protects consumer interests, because the dogma ‚the more competition the better‘ is accepted without reservation. We will demonstrate that antitrust regulation can harm consumer interests and will consistently prove the following theses in general: Antitrust regulation leads to a new, forced market equilibrium from which no participant has an interest in deviating. Regulation results in an equilibrium that is less profitable for consumers but more profitable for players that are not subject to antitrust regulation. In maximising their profit, players will offer quantities to the market such that the price on the market will increase and the total quantity offered will decrease. The efficiency of production decreases as a result of regulation. Although anti-monopoly regulation leads to a redistribution of market shares and profits, it generally leads to an increase in the equilibrium price for consumers and thus harms their interests. Keywords: consumer protection; Nash Equilibrium; antitrust regulation; protection of competition (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nwe:eajour:y:2024:i:4:p:722-739 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Economic Alternatives from University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria Contact information at EDIRC. |
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