Literature Survey on New Participative Pricing Mechanisms for Wine Tastings

Jon H. Hanf
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Jon H. Hanf: Geisenheim University, Germany

Journal of Applied Management and Investments, 2014, vol. 3, issue 4, 201-213

Abstract: “Pay What You Want” is a pricing strategy where buyers pay any desired amount for a given commodity, sometimes including zero. Giving the buyers freedom to pay what they want can be very successful in some situations, because it eliminates many disadvantages of conventional pricing, e.g. the fear of whether a product is worth a given set price and the related risk of disappointment. In Germany most often wine tastings are for free despite of the associated costs. However, visitors often feel obliged to buy some bottles of wine even though they are not in favor of this wine. Hence, dissatisfaction might occur. Hence, other strategies have to be developed in order to cover the costs while reducing the risk of dissatisfaction. In this context we want to discuss the possibility to introduce “Pay-What-You-Want” pricing in the German wine business. We will first provide a literature overview. Afterwards we will combine these findings with existing example.

Keywords: Pay-what-you-want; wine tasting; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ods:journl:v:3:y:2014:i:4:p:201-213

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