Competition and regulation in retail banking

Oecd

OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy, 2011, vol. 11, issue 3, 101-165

Abstract: The Competition Committee debated retail banking in October 2006. Competition can improve the functioning of the retail banking sector without harming prudential regulation. The efficient functioning of the sector is important for economic performance. The sector is considered special primarily because of externalities related to potential “contagion” effects stemming from (i) the withdrawal-upondemand characteristic of some bank deposits and (ii) the role banks play in the payment system, and (iii) the fact that banks are important for the funding of consumers and SMEs. Customer mobility and choice is essential to simulate retail-banking competition. An important observation is that the degree of customer mobility is low and the longevity of customer-bank relationships is long. Financial information sharing platforms should therefore be promoted and, where limited by privacy laws, privacy laws should be modified in a way that maintains the goal of protecting privacy while also allowing consumers to receive the benefits of credit ratings.

Date: 2011
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