 Private remediesOecd OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy, 2011, vol. 11, issue 2, 7-105 Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated private remedies in June 2006. The roundtable focused on class actions/collective actions and the interface between private enforcement and public enforcement: • Class Actions/Collective Actions: There is a strong case for the use fo class actions/collective actions to raise levels of deterrence and achieve greater compliance with competition laws, as theses actions may be the only practical way to ensure that customers with small claims also have their day in court. • Interface between Public and Private Enforcement: There is a widely shared concern that private litigation in competition cases can interfere with leniency programs in cartel cases. There is a trade-off between enabling the victims of a cartel to recover damages and incentives for cartel members to come forward, and no-one really knows with certainty how much protection from private litigation and damage awards is necessary so as not to deter leniency applicants. The prevailing view is that the integrity of leniency programs should be protected by a range of measures that limit a leniency applicant’s exposure to civil damages, but some delegates felt that the current trend provided unnecessary protection to leniency applicants to the detriment of private plaintiffs. Date: 2011 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5kg9qgf34z5l Access Statistics for this article More articles in OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy from OECD Publishing Contact information at EDIRC. |
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