Modulated fees for Extended Producer Responsibility schemes (EPR)

Frithjof Laubinger, Andrew Brown, Maarten Dubois and Peter Börkey
Additional contact information
Frithjof Laubinger: OECD
Andrew Brown: OECD
Maarten Dubois: OECD
Peter Börkey: OECD

No 184, OECD Environment Working Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: One of the key objectives of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is to instigate design for the environment. In collective EPR schemes, the fee schedule set by Producer Responsibility Organisations (PROs) is typically quite simple and provides weak incentives for design change by producers. Fee modulation, changing fees paid by producers in a collective EPR scheme based on product design, can provide producers with stronger design incentives, but adds complexity to the system. The paper defines a classification for fee modulation (by criteria and methodology) and discusses potential challenges and opportunities. It concludes with key policy insights that can further stimulate this emerging policy approach.

Keywords: circular economy; extended producer responsibility; product stewardship; resource efficiency; sustainable consumption; waste management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L15 O14 Q53 Q56 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1787/2a42f54b-en (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:envaaa:184-en

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in OECD Environment Working Papers from OECD Publishing Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().