Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?

Teresa Ter-Minassian

OECD Journal on Budgeting, 2007, vol. 6, issue 3, 1-11

Abstract: Experience indicates that fiscal rules can be helpful as a disciplinary device at the central government level. This article explores whether fiscal rules could be usefully adopted in a decentralised framework, where the behaviour of subnational governments may undermine fiscal discipline.

Date: 2007
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