Optimal School Design

Jacopo Bizzotto and Adrien Vigier
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Adrien Vigier: University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Working Papers from Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School

Abstract: We consider a population of students with heterogeneous characteristics, and examine the dual design problem consisting of (a) allocating students to schools and (b) choosing how to grade students in school, with a view to optimizing students' incentives to work hard. We show that any optimal school design exhibits stratification, and more lenient grading at the top-tier schools than at the bottom-tier schools. Our results highlight a novel trade-off between the size of the pie and its equal division in the context of school design.

Keywords: Education; Moral Hazard; Grading; Peer Effects; Stratification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oml:wpaper:202103

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3877063

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